- D.L. Jacobs
- 30 minutes ago
- 21 min read
On Parvini'sThe Populist Delusion
July 16, 2025
All page numbers in round brackets are taken from Parvini’s book.
Is there a history of Machiavellians, or of those who take the world as it is rather than it ought to be?
Should there be?
On its surface, Neema Parvini’s The Populist Delusion may appear like an introduction to the thought of various “elite theorists” – or thinkers concerned with the structure, composition and role of the ruling elite in society – from the 20th century. However, the trajectory of his book ends with a criticism of the hopes placed in the “wave of populism” (backcover) unleashed since Trump’s 2016 presidential campaign. Trump’s “failure to bring about any meaningful change” (backcover), for Parvini, is not an “aberration” as some might think, but the latest chapter in what the Machiavellians long ago articulated as the inevitable outcome of society. Parvini’s hope in retreading the history of Machiavellian thought is summed up in the book’s final sentence: “after decades of chronic mismanagement from the current ‘managers’, perhaps all we can hope for is a vaguely sensible replacement for a few years whose interests will be closer to those of ‘the people’” (147).
This may seem as if Parvini is burying the lead – and maybe one thinks I am doing the same here – but the slow and methodical presentation of each thinker in Parvini’s text is as important as the ideas he provides in the book’s chapters. Parvini has set himself the task of authoring a book on politics in the style of James Burnham’s famous characterization of The Machiaviallians: “to see the world as it is and not how it ought to be” (8). In fact, the structure of his book mimics Burnham’s The Machiaviallians. The presentation is supposed to teach the Machiavellian mindset to the reader. Like Burnham, Parvini’s “book [is] about the realities of power and how it functions, stripped of all ideological baggage” (3). If Parvini had colored the presentation with something normative, it would violate this principle.
This school of political thinking has its own history and it is worth considering why Parvini turned to these thinkers. When James Burnham – the subject of chapter 7 – published his Managerial Revolution in 1941, he felt that “Socialism [had] not come about, nor even been approached." [I] The disappointment with the failure to achieve this ideal turned on the ideal itself. Consequently, Burnham sought to explain, as the subtitle of the book says, “What is Happening in the World.” Likewise, Samuel T. Francis – the subject of chapter 8 – wrote in the introduction to his Leviathan and its Enemies, that he wished to “revise and reformulate the theory of the managerial revolution as advanced by James Burnham in 1941." [II] Francis was writing shortly after the fall of the Soviet Union, but critical of the victor. Thus, this kind of book that Parvini wrote in 2022, in the wake of Trump’s defeat and the ostensible return to normalcy, has come and gone in cycles.
But to say what is, is not limited to what is existent at any time. Potential is real or it could not become. Even in our attempts to just describe the “facts,” we necessarily touch on concepts such as possibility and condition – we imply that things could be different.
It is therefore worth considering how the thinkers in Parvini’s book form a constellation that help Parvini to explain the failure of Trump’s first term. His book captures a moment from the last half-decade and we may get an insight into what is already fading from memory. After all, Trump is now back in the White House. While Trump’s return to the White House and his flurry of executive orders may seem to bury the feeling of 2022, at the time, Trump seemed like a fluke. Both the Left and “dissident” Right were depressed with the return of not just the Democrats, but former Obama administration officials to the White House. We would be remiss if we didn’t consider why the world had to appear how it did in 2022 and how it feels now – and what that might say about change.
Overview
The language of Gaetano Mosca (the subject of chapter 1) –The Ruling Class – could not be more apposite to the feeling at the time, and Parvini credits Mosca with providing the “most basic conceptual units in our analysis of power and politics” (11). As Mosca writes:
the man who is at the head of the state would certainly not be able to govern without the support of a numerous class to enforce respect for his orders and to have them carried out; and granting that he can make one individual, or indeed many individuals, in the ruling class feel the weight of his power, he certainly cannot be at odds with the class as a whole or do away with it. [III]
Imagine reading this passage a few years ago, right after Trump’s open struggle with the “Deep State” and during the technocrats’ marionette of Joe Biden. It would be hard not to find resonance with this passage from Mosca at the time.
At the time, we saw familiar faces from the Obama administration – Anthony Blinken, Jake Sullivan, Victoria Nuland – return to the White House. The “anti-fascism” of Trump’s first term came to appear like an ideology cooked up by Mosca’s “numerous class” to remove Trump and return to “normalcy.” Not even Marxism was spared from this indictment. Benedict Cryptofash proposed the need for an “antileftist Marxism” in 2021, recasting the entirety of Marxism as the fight against the Left. Similarly, a Neo-Stalinist “Marxism-Leninism” gradually emerged, as such a tendency seemed innocent of the “Trump-bumped” DSA, whose opposition to Trump was held responsible for bringing “Genocide Joe” to office. A revived notion of “social fascism” and Barbara Ehrenreich’s Professional Managerial Class (PMC) mirrored by a return to a Burnhamite and Christopher Lasch formulation of the same ideas on the Right. Thus, the Left, out of disappointment with the DSA, and the “dissident” Right, converged on a similar focus on the PMC out of a sense of déjà vu. Before the Israel-Palestine war separated the Left and Right again, this convergence even hinted at some kind of political alliance e.g., the 2023 anti-NATO rally held in Washington, D.C.
Parvini takes this moment as his point of departure and wants to show that there is a broader history of ideas that provides an insight into the present. Thus, despite Mosca’s crucial insight, Parvini cannot stop with him, but needs to develop the idea. Mosca still believed that society would progress towards having “an independent and fair judiciary backed by strong rule of law, [and] morally upstanding and law-abiding citizenry” (24). Parvini responds that:
[i]f the ruling class keep [sic] political prisoners and act in an arbitrary manner, do not give the ruled the right to a fair trial, do not persecute [sic] serious crimes and let criminals loose on the streets, and so on, then it is evidence of a lack of juridical defence (24)
In 2022, this seems to allude to the difference in prosecution between the George Floyd and January 6th protesters. Indeed, Parvini, in the sentence after the one quoted above, refers to Samuel Francis’s “anarcho-tyranny” or a “combination of oppressive government power against the innocent and the law-abiding and, simultaneously, a grotesque paralysis of the ability or the will to use that power to carry out basic public duties such as protection or public safety.” [IV]
Francis, who returns in one of the final chapters, is both in the tradition of Mosca, but dealing with circumstances that may look like the overcoming of “Mosca’s law” (143) or where the “domination of a minority is inevitable” (12). By signaling Francis at the beginning of the text, the trajectory of the rest of the book – arriving at the post-Cold War administered society – is illuminated. The problem articulated by Mosca at the beginning of the 20th century has transformed, and the architectonic of the text tracks this historical change. The reason Society continues to forget the old lesson, is because the problem has morphed.
Thus, in the next chapter, Parvini presents Vilfredo Pareto’s circulation of elites. The circulation of elites is dependent not just on material changes, but changes in sentiment (32). That is, it is not enough to say the ruling class holds power because they control resources – they must maintain their authority in the eyes of the subjugated at the level of both reason and instinct. The gap between power and authority opens up a dynamic. The specialists of persuasion, the “foxes” for Pareto, cunningly utilize the specialists of coercion, the “lions” for Pareto, to overthrow competing elites. A condition for this change is the delusion of the “lions,” their “nonlogical” ideas for Pareto, which are used to turnover the elites.
Once Pareto and Mosca are introduced by Parvini, his text no longer just proceeds from one thinker to another, but accumulates upon past populist delusions. Old limits seem to be overthrown only to come back in new forms.
For example, the populist explosion that blew up in the mid-2010’s in both political parties expressed the discontent of the base with their parties’ leadership. This internal and at times, Oedipal battle, between the New/Old Democrats/Republicans lays the basis for Parvini’s presentation of Mosca and Pareto’s student, Robert Michels.
Michels extended the elite theory “to all organisations” and derived what he called the “iron law of oligarchy” (43 – italics in original). Michels explains why, for Parvini, Sanders and The Squad’s struggle with the “ancient leaders” (52) of the Democratic Party (Pelosi, Schumer, etc.) can never become anything more, but the circulation of an older party elite for fresh faces. Sanders and AOC’ recent “Fighting Oligarchy Tour," then, is paradoxically the new Oligarchy’s ideology for overthrowing the old Oligarchy.
Oligarchy was inevitable in mass political parties because as Michels showed, “[e]ven if you solved the problem of selfish leaders, you still have the problem of the helpless masses” (55). For Parvini, the January 6th riot showed the masses dependence upon leadership. Once in the Capitol, the Jan 6’ers could do no more than devolve into a riot with no purpose. "There was no plan, no coordination, no leadership. Michels would have predicted that it would have turned out as it did” (48).
The post-Covid/January 6th moment “showed an amazed global audience the US system under crisis” (60). Such a crisis pushed liberalism to reveal its fangs and it is here where Parvini turns to Carl Schmitt to make sense of the mainstream animosity towards Trump in his first turn:
A [Carl] Schmittian analysis of these details would show us three things: first, Donald Trump, despite holding the office of US President, never had sovereignty; second, whoever is sovereign in the United States – which one suspects is neither Joe Biden nor the Supreme Court – did not like Donald Trump very much and sought to make him an exception; third, there is no sovereignty in ‘the people’ whatsoever and the preamble of the US Constitution, ‘We the People’, is an empty slogan (61).
For Parvini, while the preceding “elite theorists sought chiefly to attack democracy as a sham” (61), Schmitt’s theory exposes the “myths of liberalism” (65). When Trump and his base are characterized as threats to the “foundations of our republic” by Joe Biden in the Fall of 2022, it may seem as if the US had fallen into a state of exception. But for Parvini, “we are nearly constantly in the [state of] exception” (63). It is what essentially characterizes the political qua political. This permanent state of exception gives political power a “theological” (65) nature, or one beyond the laws that govern society. Political power must ultimately appear as if it came from without. The ideas of liberal democracy, then, are only there to provide internal cohesion, or as Pareto would have said (for Parvini), they are “’experimentally false’ but…nonetheless have a ‘social utility’” (33).
Certainly, Leftists have been receptive to Schmitt’s criticism of liberalism. He seems to give a “mask-off” exposure of liberalism as having always been a fraud. The first four thinkers discussed may say things that are objectionable to the Left, but their criticism does not accuse the Left of doing anything more than denying reality. The real challenge to the Left comes in the back-half of this book. These last four thinkers that Parvini introduces – Betrand de Jouvenal, James Burnham, Samuel T. Francis and Paul Gottfried – all lay responsibility for the present with not only the Left’s failure to overcome the elite, but their obscuring and deepening of the power of elite rule.
Betrand de Jouvenal’s book, On Power, was published shortly after WW2 and lays the responsibility for the war at the feet of the Statists, socialist or not. For Jouvenal, Power fulfilled not only the egoist’s hopes but “that of altruistic or, more accurately, socialist hopes as well.” [V] The means by which it does this is called the “high-low middle mechanism” by Parvini (77). It is not actually a phrase that Jouvenal uses, but is based on C.A. Bond’s interpretation of Jouvenal. Nonetheless, for Parvini, Jouvenal gives the “exact mechanism” (Parvini’s emphasis) through which Pareto’s “circulation of elites” occurs (86).
Jouvenal frequently speaks in cryptic language – the word Power is presented like a crafty Demiurge in On Power – but the thought figure is simple. Power, or the control over social resources [VI], is concentrated by “the high – the central power…[through] patronising the low” and draining power away from the middle (77). In the process, “the lower stratum of the ruling class [is transformed into] non-governing elites” (80). In other words, Power has concentrated over history through the pseudo-empowerment of the subaltern classes being directed by the high-power against minor rivals. The lower classes, in the process, come to identify with Power and the State, as they are bureaucratized to carry out Power’s dirty work. Jouvenal, as Parvini points out, has a history of this: "'the clan cell', ‘the baronial cell’, and ‘the capitalistic cell’” (79). Jouvenal’s history rhymes with Marx, but with a twist: the history of class struggles turns out to be nothing but the cunning of capital-P “Power.” Marxism is just the latest chapter in the ruse of Power.
Disappointed Leftists had come to this conclusion in the past. No wonder the chapter on former Trotskyist, James Burnham, follows the presentation of Jouvenal. Burnham’s Managerial Revolution registered the overcoming of the previous antagonist – the capitalist – but without realizing the emancipation of society. The nemesis which had motivated the popular movements of the fin de siècle became invisible by the mid-20th century: who ruled, the property-owner or the management? Was the real ruling class even overthrown in the Russian Revolution?
Burnham soon followed his 1941 book with his 1943 book, The Machiavellians, and it is this which really influences Parvini’s text. Parvini writes that Burnham’s contribution to “elite theorists is his own idea of how revolutions take place” (103). It is worth quoting a passage from the end of The Machiavellians that Parvini also quotes:
From a Machiavellian point of view, a social revolution means a comparatively rapid shift in the composition and structure of the elite and in the mode of its relation to the non-elite. It is possible to state the conditions under which such a rapid shift takes place. The principal of these conditions are the following: 1. When the institutional structure, and the elite which had the ruling position within this structure, are unable to handle possibilities opened up by technological advances and by the growth, for whatever reason, of new social forces. 2. When a considerable percentage of the ruling class devotes little attention to the business of ruling, and turns its interests to such fields as culture, art, philosophy, and the pursuit of sensuous pleasure. 3. When an elite is unable or unwilling to assimilate rising new elements from the masses or from its own lower ranks. 4. When large sections of the elite lose confidence in themselves and the legitimacy of their own rule; and when in both elite and non-elite there is a loss of faith in the political formulas and myths that have held the social structure together. 5. When the ruling class, or much of it, is unable or unwilling to use force in a firm and determined way, and instead tries to rely almost exclusively on manipulation, compromise, deceit, and fraud. [VII]
It is here, with Burnham, that we have arrived at the self-conception of The Machiavellian political theorist. Mosca, Pareto and Michels all have devoted chapters in Burnham’s The Machiavellians. The impulse to explain the world how it is, rather than how it ought to be, is in direct contradistinction to the dreams of the earlier, revolutionary Left. Clearly, Burnham was fighting with his past. In fact, let’s compare the above passage to another one, from Vladimir Lenin:
No doubt Burnham, as a former Trotskyist, is familiar with this paragraph. Both Burnham and Lenin agree that a precondition for revolution is when the upper classes are unable to rule in the old way and lower classes do not want to live in the old way. The difference comes down to Lenin’s third condition – when the masses enter into “independent historical action.” It is this that Burnham gave up on and reflects his conservative turn.
Parvini writes that after a century, the truth of managerial domination has become “so obvious...as to [now] seem trite” (94). But actually, it has transformed quite a bit. Ultimately, the managerial regime that Burnham described was a lot less stable than he could have imagined. The advance of the technocracy created a “double movement” [VIII] as Andre Gorz would later write in the 1960s. Management rested on “a contradictory and mediated form” [IX] of worker self-organization and, as Burnham had seen, grew at the expense of the power of the bourgeoisie. The managerial form seemed to mock socialism. But as Gorz noted, to the degree that the workers movement could not organize an independent opposition, the technocracy would seek “[to] deploy its forces with the aim of attracting into its camp and integrating into the institutions of the capitalist State all the labor organizations which are susceptible to such a maneuver.” [X]
The New Left did not take up this task of breaking the management from the state. They thought they were throwing out the managers, but they just updated them. As Penn Kemble put it, “these new forces themselves constitute an interest group which differs from the “old” interest groups chiefly in its refusal to acknowledge the degree to which it hungers for political power and patronage.” Worse, as Stanley Sharpey has shown recently, the New Left used the concept of the Professional Managerial Class “to explain the failure of the New Left,” thereby apologizing for the missed opportunity.
This is the background to Samuel T. Francis and Paul Gottfried, the focus of the last two main chapters of Parvini’s book.
The tendency towards conformity Francis traces to the ``dematerialization of property” carried out by the managerial regime. [XI] The owners of the means of production long ago made themselves targets for the resentment of the dispossessed. They could be cast as parasites, loafers, “coupon-cutters,” etc. Management had no problem playing along and treating the owners as “faux frais.” Like a true materialist, Francis sees the collapse of individual social being reflected in the identification with the managerial apparatus.
Burnham’s managerial regime ended up preserving itself through the revolutionary authority of the New Left. There indeed was a revolution and the gains of the 60s are held as accomplished by mainstream politics. Consequently, consensus is considered settled on many cultural issues and any challenge to this, as Paul Gottfried writes, is bludgeoned by “employing the past as a club." [XII] Even the celebration of Martin Luther King Day, for Parvini, is tainted by the fact that “no freedom is afforded to [debate] the annual celebration” (114).
The State, in the meantime, now presents itself as the defender of the gains of the 60’s. For Parvini, Gottfried demonstrates that the “theoretical relationship” that the government is supposed to serve the people has become completely “inverted” by the “modern managerial regime” (127). Such inversion was long ago announced by the very democratic demands the Left made. The extension of state policy to the previously marginalized and dispossessed meant the extension of the unelected bureaucracy. Gottfried himself recalls Elizabeth Fox-Genovese telling him that “public control of entitlements sets up…the abdication of self-government.” [XIII] In other words, the demands of the New Left have been realized, but only in the most one-sided way in the Neoliberal era.
Gottfried is led to ask: “[is Democracy] to be identified with self-conscious peoples ruling themselves, or does it entail the establishment and maintenance of “civic culture” by experts with “progressive” social views?” [XIV]
“Woke capitalism,” as Parvini claims, proves that the “managers have primacy” (111). However, the form that this takes is no longer like the principal-agent conflicts over investment that were the model in Burnham’s time. Owners are removed from their companies due to their “problematic” statements e.g., Papa John’s John Schattner N-word fiasco. This is really where we arrive at the modern understanding of professional managerial class e.g., the human resources representative.
Mass Politics
What all of the thinkers mentioned have in common is their engagement with the puzzle of modern, mass politics. Political decisions did not always involve the whole of society. Now, even when the masses are passive, their apathy plays a part in the system.
What concerns these elite theorists is not, do the masses participate in politics, but how do they participate? Parvini supplies a passage from Mosca where the latter states that “the dominion of an organized minority, obeying a single impulse, over the unorganized majority is inevitable” (12). And yet, on the next page, Parvini quotes Mosca saying that the “truth is that the representative has himself elected by the voters” (13 – Mosca’s italics). Here Mosca is head-and-shoulders above the Left who shriek about the machinations of the “ruling elite.” What is really at stake here is explaining how, writes Jouvenal, even if a “person chosen to govern...[was] exactly resembling their subjects...once they have been summoned to exercise sovereign authority, their wills take on...a new character and different force.” [XV]
The “ruling elite” do not come from without, and yet, the better organization of the elite make them necessarily appear so. But organizing what? Their better organization is a feature of the very masses lorded over.
What the elite theorists pick-up on is the non-identity between the actions and statements of the rulers, and the immediate, empirical consciousness of the masses. But they stop there. As Paul Mattick wrote in 1961 in his review of a book that took up a theme similar to Parvini’s [XVI], “[t]his theory is simple and seems very convincing because of the enormous evidence that supports it. It...is as old as mankind itself. It consists of a well-founded scepticism regarding man's ability to become a truly social being.”
However, this distinction was once understood as specifying a historical problem. The revolutionaries of the Second International always felt that revolutionary consciousness could only “be brought to [the workers] from without.” This did not mean, however, that it came deus ex machina, but was rather “a product of the historical movement” – the birth of science, as Marx would say. This is why the proletarian socialist party was the “higher consciousness of the historical tasks of the working class than…the immediate consciousness of the class itself.” Again, just to emphasize: it is not that the members of the party had a higher consciousness than other people, but that the party – “sum (and not the mere arithmetical sum, but a complex) of organisations” – is itself the embodiment of historical consciousness. Parvini aptly demonstrates in this text that the elite theorists have understood changes in history through the interrelationship between institutional forms that mediate the rulers and ruled. Implied in that recognition of history is a sense of repetition, of a revolution in life that can be anticipated.
The real difference, then, was that for the Marxists, this historical process could become self-conscious. Revolutionary social consciousness came from without because it was historical consciousness. For the party embodied the hard-won recognition of the necessity that the workers should lead society and reorganize it in their image. That task not only diverged from the immediate, day-to-day interests of the workers, but may directly contradict their empirical interests as workers.
Thus, the distinction between the party and the class could also be productive – it allowed people to think at variance with the world, to mediate their immediate lives with history. The party was to help the mass of people to think of themselves as a subject through their representatives.
The persons chosen by the masses were to be not just subjects, but also objects for the masses. The tight organization that Mosca saw intimidating the masses, was understood as demanded by an indeterminate mass struggling to transform itself into a class. [XVIII]
In fact, is there really anything here that was not explored in the history of Marxism? Certainly, Lenin believed that “[u]nless the masses are organised, the proletariat is nothing.” This would hardly surprise Mosca, who felt that “[the] power of any minority is irresistible as against each single individual in the majority, who stands alone before the totality of the organized minority.” [XVII] Did not Rosa Luxemburg, in the same year that Michels published his Political Parties (1911), write that if “the independent intellectual life of the mass of the party, is not active enough, then the central authorities have the quite natural tendency to not only bureaucratically rust but also to get a totally wrong idea of their own official authority and position of power with respect to the party.” Carl Schmitt would agree with Marx that “after 1848, the qualitative distinction between state and society... lost its previous clarity.” [XVIX] Did not Engels speak of the “superstitious reverence” of the State? Burnham’s theory of the managerial revolution is perhaps directly lifted from Marx’s analysis that capitalism already has a tendency to transform the “actually functioning capitalist into a mere manager.” Marx, like Francis, thought that pure egalitarianism was a “regression to the unnatural simplicity of the poor and crude man who has few needs and who has not only failed to go beyond private property, but has not yet even reached it.”
What made the Marxist theory of class struggle critical, was the self-consciousness that class oppression would remain even with the conquest of the proletariat. The emancipation of classes in the pre-capitalist era meant their emancipation from other classes; here, with the modern proletariat, emancipation meant from being a class. It was the struggle against class per se that led to this “decisive change in the conception of history” for Marx and Engels. In light of the modern class struggle, all previous class victories came to appear like missed opportunities to overcome class altogether. For history, in its final instance, is the demand for redemption – in this case, it is the demand to overcome the history of class struggles and throw the latter into prehistory.
But the crushing burden of defeat of Marxism in the 20th century seems to inhibit the dialectic. Rather than the promise of qualitative transformation, we have the bad infinity of the ruling class being disposed of only to appear again. It is only a small step for one to hypostatize this prehistorical struggle into the human condition. Pareto’s image of the “circulation of elites” fits well for a Left that no longer struggles for power, but hysterically shrieks about the machinations of the “elite.” That there is a Left today that uses the terms “ruling elite” and “ruling class” interchangeably means a regression below the horizon of class struggle.
Although Parvini claims he only intends “to advance a value-free analysis which is not in the service of any ideology” (8), the irony is that there is an ought at work. The text is supposed to demonstrate the preferred form of political analysis and enlighten us from false hopes. That Parvini finds purchase in this chain of past thinkers expresses the wish that some delusion not be repeated.
In trying to merely describe, Parvini has to give an account of what came to be and he arrives right at the edge of what could become. The repetition that is inherent in a blind necessity that continues to constrain, knocks on the door and demands to be made conscious.
If Parvini’s book succeeds in exploding the Populist Delusion, then he simultaneously undermines his own premise. Either the masses are taught they are helpless and the book becomes part of the same ruling ideology it exposed, or it teaches the masses not to be fooled this time. Freed from the chimera that a “critical mass of the public will suddenly reach a ‘tipping point’ after which elites will be inevitably toppled” (10), the mass will learn Parvini’s dictum that “[c]hange always takes concerted organization and cannot hope to be achieved simply by convincing the greatest number of people your point of view” (10, Parvini’s emphasis). A mass taught not to be deluded is also a mass that cannot be used by Power.
[I]: James Burnham, 1941, The Managerial Revolution (New York: The Joint Day Company, Inc): 41.
[II]: Samuel T. Francis, 1991, Leviathan and Its Enemies (Fitzgerald Griffin Foundation): Author’s Preface.
[III] Gaetano Mosca, 1939, The Ruling Class, translated by Hannah D. Kahn (New York, McGraw-Hill Book Company): 51.
[IV]: Samuel T. Francis, July 1994, “Anarcho-Tyranny, U.S.A.,” Chronicles: A Magazine of American Culture.
[V]: Bertrand de Jouvenal, On power, its nature and the history of its growth, translated by J.F. Huntington, (New York, Viking Press): 131. Jouvenel uses the category Power throughout his book, On power, its nature and the history of its growth.
[VI]: ibid: 18.
[VII]: James Burnham, The Machiavellians: Defenders of Freedom, (Putnam and Company Limited: London): 167-168
[VIII]: Andreas Gorz, 1967, “A Strategy for Labor” in The New Left Reader, ed. Carl Oglesby (New York: Grove Press): 45.
[IX]: ibid: 46.
[X]: ibid: 48.
[XI]: Samuel T. Francis, Leviathan and Its Enemies (Washington Summit Publishers, 2021): 36-37.
[XII]: Paul Gottfried, Multiculturalism and the politics of guilt: Toward a secular theocracy. University of Missouri Press, 2002: 73.
[XIII]: ibid: 7.
[XIV]: ibid: 7.
[XV]: Bertrand de Jouvenal, On power, its nature and the history of its growth, translated by J.F. Huntington, (New York, Viking Press): 112.
[XVI]: Max Nomad, 1959, Aspects of Revolt, (New York: Bookman Associates).
[XVII] Gaetano Mosca, 1939, The Ruling Class, translated by Hannah D. Kahn (New York, McGraw-Hill Book Company): 51.
[XVIII]: “When people here speak of Chartists and radicals, they almost always have in mind the lower strata of society, the mass of proletarians, and it is true that the party’s few educated spokesmen are lost among the masses.” Friedrich Engels, November 29, 1842, “The English View of Internal Crisis,” in Marx and Engels Collected Works Volume 2:.
[XVIX]: Carl Schmitt, 1932 The concept of the political, (University of Chicago Press, 2008): 24.
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